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We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that 
the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the 
perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect 
individuals’ subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments 
through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent 
trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We 
find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust 
in which participants’ relative performance framed trusting behavior. 
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Social scientists from across ﬁelds have emphasized the importance of trust
within organizations. For example, trust (directly or indirectly) yield higher
levels of cooperation, more positive workplace attitudes, higher levels of perfor-
mance, promotes eﬀective responses to crisis, facilitates rapid formulation of ad
hoc working groups, and reduces contracting costs.1 Moreover, trust and trust-
worthiness in labor markets (via norms of reciprocity) result in higher wages,
increased worker eﬀort, and greater eﬃciency (Fehr et al., 1998; G¨ achter and
Fehr, 2002). As such, many have emphasized the importance of developing
social institutions and organizational designs that promote an environment of
trust among individuals. Receiving signiﬁcant emphasis in this regard has been
the development of work teams and team-based organizations, which ostensi-
bly increase levels of trust (Mohrman et al., 1995; Tannenbaum et al., 1992;
Woodman and Sherwood, 1980).
Based on a cross-disciplinary analysis of the literature and deﬁntions on trust
Rousseau et al. (1998) describe it as a psychological state in which one accepts
vulnerability or exposure based on the positive intentions or behaviors of oth-
ers. Given this characterization of trust as a belief or attitude with respect
to the actions of others, it is natural to think of trust (as with any psycho-
logical state) as being in part motivated by framing eﬀects and the decision
environment in which one ﬁnds herself. For example, within organizations there
exist signiﬁcant levels of explicit and implicit contracting which may heighten
or marginalize the development of trust. These explicit and implicit contracts
are embedded in compensation schemes and organizational hierarchies in which
decision-makers ﬁnd themselves. For example, compensation schemes may af-
fect workers’ goals and needs, in turn aﬀecting workers’ behaviors and their
1For example, see Hardin (2002); Kramer and Tyler (1996); Williamson (1993). Dirks and
Ferrin (2001) review the literature on trust in organizations.
2manifest trust or trustworthiness (Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Mohrman et al.,
1995). Alternately, organizational hierarchies / internal labor markets aﬀect
the roles workers accept and an organization’s culture, inherently facilitating
or mitigating the way trust is fostered within the organization (Perrow, 1986).
These eﬀects may be particularly acute with respect to the “moderating eﬀect”
of trust (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001) in which trust facilitates the eﬀect of various
determinants of workplace attitudes and the conditions for cooperation.
In this paper we explore the eﬀect of diﬀerent incentive structures on ob-
served behavior in a simple trust game. More speciﬁcally, we explore the use of
relative performance evaluations (i.e. tournaments) and joint performance eval-
uations (i.e. team-based incentives) on behavior in the trust game of Berg et al.
(1995). We focus on these two types of mechanisms as they are often observed
in internal labor markets and there exists signiﬁcant divergence between the
theoretical predictions and practical applicability of these mechanisms.2 We
ﬁnd that each mechanism has a diﬀerent eﬀect on observed trust and trust-
worthiness, a diﬀerence which appears to depend on the relative performance
of the individuals. We conjecture that diﬀerent incentive mechanisms create
diﬀerent contexts for decision-making, thereby creating diﬀerent perceptions of
one’s entitlement to assets which frame trusting behavior. These diﬀerences are
manifest through diﬀerent behaviors in our trust game.
Our experiments serve to highlight the relationship between trust in organi-
zations and the incentive design and build on the large literature on behavior in
trust games.3 Moreover, our experiments build on the literature exploring trust
2While theory often predicts the use of strong tournament style incentives, their use in
practice is relatively limited. See Che and Yoo (2001), Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Prender-
gast (1999).
3See Camerer (2003) for a review of the literature. Much of this research has focused
on disentangling the eﬀects of outcomes and intentions on behavior. See Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) (outcome-based model of inequity aversion) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
(intention-based model of reciprocity). For experiments to this end, see Cox (2004) and
McCabe et al. (2003).
3and “social preferences” in labor markets (Falk and Fehr, 2003; G¨ achter and
Fehr, 2002), extending this research to the issues of the internal organization of
the ﬁrm and the contract design.
Our work also builds on recent research examining the inﬂuence of rewards
and contracts on interpersonal trust. For example, Dirks and Ferrin (2001)
conducted experiments in which cooperative (i.e. team performance based) and
competitive (i.e. based on relative performance) rewards were used in versions
of the moon and wilderness survival tasks.4 Their results indicate that the re-
ward structure had a strong eﬀect on trust, with greater trust evidenced under
cooperative reward structures than under competitive reward structures. The
avenue for the eﬀect of reward structure on trust was based on an attribution
model in which the reward structure inﬂuenced one’s perceptions of a partner’s
motives and intentions. Relatedly, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) investigate
the extent to which binding and non-binding contracts inﬂuence displayed inter-
personal trust. In these experiments, participants played a variant of the trust
game against what they perceived to be a real partner (actually a computer).
The ﬁndings here suggest that non-binding contracts generate less initial coop-
eration but more personal (as opposed to situational) attributions for observed
cooperation. As a result, they suggest that non-binding contracts interfere less
with trust development than do binding contracts.
The experiments conducted here are also related to recent research on found
money eﬀects and the importance of earnings in bargaining games.5 Most ger-
mane to this paper are the experiments of Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) in which
participants earned money prior to participating in a trust game. Three variants
4These tasks involve participants ranking various tools and items needed for survival in
various environments. See Marcic (1995).
5In these experiments, legitimizing assets on the part of senders (through having senders
earn their wealth) leads to more self-interested behavior in dictator and ultimatum games
(Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al., 2002). On the other hand, legitimizing assets on the part of
receivers leads to greater oﬀers from senders (Ruﬄe, 1998).
4of this game were conducted: one in which only the trustor earned money, one
in which only the trustee earned money, and one in which both the participants
earned money. These experiments indicate that (i) the stronger the property
rights of the trustor, the greater the amount returned by the trustee and (ii) the
stronger the property rights of the trustee, the greater the amount invested by
the trustor. As in these experiments, participants in our experiments exerted
eﬀort to earn money. However, our interest is more on how structural diﬀerences
in the earning phase inﬂuence subsequent behavior.
We continue as follows: sections 2 and 3 describe our experiment and present
the results. In our trust games with earnings, we ﬁnd that the structure of
the incentive mechanisms used in the earnings phase of the experiments had
noticeable eﬀects on the ways in which individuals behave in the subsequent
trust game. Section 4 discusses our results and section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted the one-shot, two-participant trust game of Berg et al. (1995).
In the trust game, a sender is allocated $10 and asked to choose an investment
x ∈ [0,10] to send to a receiver. This amount is tripled by the experimenter and
the receiver is allocated 3x. Of this amount, the receiver was asked to choose
an amount y ∈ [0,3x] to return to the sender. Final payoﬀs to the sender (S)
and the receiver (R) are given by
ΠS = 10 − x + y, (1)
ΠR = 3x − y. (2)
Given self-interested preferences over own wealth, the receiver in this game
will choose y = 0 to maximize her wealth. Given this behavior, the sender
5will choose x = 0, yielding payoﬀs of ΠS = 10 and ΠR = 0 (the sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium). Note that an allocation is not (Pareto) eﬃcient in
that both parties could have received larger payoﬀs if x > 0 and y > 0 had
been chosen. However, such an outcome necessitates that the sender trusts the
receiver not to choose y = 0. Experimentally, it has been observed that amounts
invested average 50% of the amounts available (i.e. x = 5 in this circumstance)
and receivers return approximately one-third of what they receive (Camerer,
2003).6 Such behavior is often attributed to individuals having preferences over
inequity aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), reciprocity (e.g. Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004), or eﬃciency (e.g. total payoﬀss as in Charness and
Rabin, 2002). The key to implementing an eﬃcient allocation (i.e. maximizing
the amount of available resources) is that the sender must trust the receiver and
invest x = 10, maximizing the gains from trade and yielding ΠS + ΠR = 30 to
distribute between the parties. While this game is often used as a metaphor for
instances of international trade (in which one must trust one’s trading partner
will not expropriate all of one’s goods) and non-contractible investments, we
focus on the game in the context of the internal organization of a ﬁrm in which
trust is needed to reduce contracting costs and facilitate the ﬂow of information
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2001, 2003; Kramer and Tyler, 1996).
Earnings Treatments
Our treatment variable was the mechanism utilized to determine the wealth
endowment available in the trust game. Our interest is in how the initial in-
teractions required to earn wealth framed subsequent trusting behavior. As
such, the earnings mechanisms are independent of the trust game.7 The ex-
6Results vary based on the nature of the experimental design. In all games, the key
determinant of the amounts returned y is the trust displayed in the receiver by the sender.
See Camerer (2003, section 2.7), Fehr and G¨ achter (2001) and G¨ achter and Fehr (2002).
7This stands in contrast to other experiments, such as Sonnegard (1996), in which the
ﬁrst-mover in a bargaining game is determined by some test of skill or ability.
6periments were conducted over a closed computer network and programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).8 At the end of the experiment participants received
their payoﬀs privately and in cash.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two possible incentive condi-
tions. In our joint performance evaluation (JPE) treatment, the $10 endowment
used in the trust game was earned by way of a team based incentive mecha-
nism. Speciﬁcally, each member of the bargaining pair was given eight minutes
to answer twelve questions taken from the Graduate Management Admission
Test (GMAT). Participants were informed that the pair would be awarded $10
(for use in the aforementioned trust game) if the sum of their scores exceeded
six. After the eight minute exam period elapsed, participants were informed of
their score, the score of their bargaining partner, and their respective payoﬀs.
After this information was provided, the participants were randomly assigned
to the roles of sender and receiver, the sender was allocated the pair’s earnings
($10) and the trust game ensued.
In the relative performance evaluation (RPE) treatment participants were
informed that a tournament would be used to allocate the initial $10 for use
in the trust game. Speciﬁcally, the individual within the dyad who correctly
answered the most questions was allocated $10. After the eight minute exam
period had ended, participants were informed of their scores and whether they
or their partner had won the tournament. Participants were then randomly
assigned roles in the trust game with the sender being given access to the tour-
nament prize ($10) for use in the game.
Note that as the total earnings from each group in our JPE and RPE treat-
ments are allocated to a randomly determined sender, the earnings eﬀorts are
sunk costs at the time of the trust game. As such, traditional models of behav-
ior suggest that decisions made in the trust game should be independent of the
8Treatment ﬁles and instructions are available from the authors upon request.
7earnings mechanisms employed and the relative performance of participants in
answering the GMAT-questions. Thus, the predicted the sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium in the trust game is (x,y) = (0,0) across all treatments. However,
the presence of entitlements (Hoﬀman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoﬀman et al., 1994;
Ruﬄe, 1998) or preferences over fairness and reciprocity (Bolton and Ocken-
fels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr and G¨ achter, 2001; Rabin,
1993) predict deviations from this equilibrium. The focus in our experiment
is on manner in which the alternate incentive mechanisms encountered in the
earnings phase inﬂuence behavior in the subsequent trust game.
3 Results
In this section, we analyze the results of our experiment. Participants were
recruited for the experiment from the undergraduate student body at the Uni-
versity of Calgary. A total of 126 individuals (30 bargaining pairs in the relative
performance evaluation treatment, 33 in the joint performance evaluation treat-
ment) participated in the experiment.
Trust
Table 1 provides the average investments and returns for each bargaining pair.
Across treatments we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in levels of investment (i.e. observed
trust) or returns (i.e. observed trustworthiness): F < 1 in pairwise comparisons
between the JPE and RPE treatments. Thus it appears that in aggregate the
earnings phase of the experiment had little eﬀect on behavior.
However, diﬀerences in behavior emerge when looking more closely at the
context in which the trust game was played. Speciﬁcally, since the roles of sender
and receiver were randomly assigned within the pair, senders (and receivers)
could have either been winners or losers in the tournament (RPE treatment) or
8RPE JPE
n = 30 n = 33
investment (x) 5.24 5.61
(3.00) (2.99)
return (y) 5.71 5.43
(5.42) (5.60)
Table 1: Mean investments and returns (standard deviations in parentheses).
have “contributed” more or less towards the pair’s “output” (JPE treatment).
Towards this end, we examine the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in exam scores (i.e. a
participant’s own exam score minus that of her partner) on observed behavior.9
Across earnings treatments, this diﬀerence could have diﬀerent meanings to
participants. For example, under the tournament incentive, this diﬀerence could
be construed by participants as a measure of the entitlements or property rights
associated with the earned wealth (as in Cherry et al., 2002). Under the team-
based incentive, this diﬀerence could be construed as measure of one’s relative
contribution to the pair’s goal, again dictating a certain distribution of ﬁnal
assets. However, due to the greater ambiguity regarding who “owns” the assets
to be used in the trust game, there is a greater potential for self-serving biases
regarding the perception of entitlements under this incentive mechanism (as in
Konow, 2000).
Table 2 splits the data based on whether the sender scored higher (referred
to as a winning sender WS) or lower (referred to as a losing sender LS) than
the receiver in on the initial twelve question quiz. Here we ﬁnd a diﬀerence in
the investments made by winning and losing senders. Wilcoxon tests reject the
null hypothesis that the distributions of investments across winning and losing
9We ﬁnd no eﬀect of the diﬀerent incentive mechanisms on dyad’s performance on the
exam: Wilcoxon tests reject are unable to reject the hypothesis that dyads’ total scores (i.e.




n = 14 n = 18
LS 6.60 3.75
(2.64) (3.08)
n = 16 n = 15
Table 2: Mean investments (x) for earning treatments (standard deviations
in parentheses). The notation WS (LS) denote bargaining pairs in which the
sender scored higher than the receiver on the initial quiz.
senders are the same: p = 0.03 in the RPE treatment and p = 0.02 in the
JPE treatment. Strikingly this eﬀect is asymmetric across earnings treatment:
Under the RPE, senders who won the tournament sent noticeably less than
senders who had lost the tournament. However, under the JPE, senders who
contributed relatively more to the pair’s aggregate score sent signiﬁcantly more
than senders who contributed less. Wilcoxon tests reject the null hypothesis
that the distributions of investments across earning mechanism are the same
when splitting the population by winning and losing senders. That is, winning
senders sent relatively more under the JPE than under the RPE (p = 0.02)
while losing senders sent somewhat less under the JPE than under the RPE
(p = 0.046).
While this analysis treats the diﬀerence in scores within a pair as binary
(i.e. the sender is either a winner or a loser), the results are more deﬁned
when looking at the actual relative scores of participants. Table 3 presents
regression results restricted to the earnings treatments RPE and JPE.10 The
variable ∆score represents the diﬀerence between an individual’s score on the
twelve question quiz and that of her partner. The variable RPE ∈ {0.1} is






Table 3: Regression results for investments x: ∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at p =
0.01; ∗ indicates signiﬁcance at p = 0.05. The pseudo-coeﬃcient ∆RPE +
∆score = −1.161 is signiﬁcant at p = 0.05.
a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 in the RPE treatment and 0 in the
JPE treatment. The variable ∆RPE is the interaction eﬀect between incentive
mechanism and score diﬀerence.
The results indicate that under the JPE the lower one’s contribution to the
pair’s aggregate score (i.e. the lower one’s score diﬀerence ∆score), the lower
a sender’s revealed trust in her partner (i.e. the lower was x). On the other
hand, the greater the degree to which one lost the tournament under the RPE,
the greater was one’s demonstrated trust. This asymmetric relationship across
earnings treatments is presented in Figure 1. Again, under the tournament
incentive increased diﬀerences in exam scores had a negative eﬀect on levels of
observed trust. That is, senders who had lost the tournament invested larger
amounts than those senders who had won the tournament. Further, as presented
in ﬁgure 1, losing (winning) senders invested more (less) when their margin of
defeat (victory) was greater. Behavior is markedly diﬀerent under the team-
based incentive. As opposed to the RPE treatments, diﬀerence in exam scores
had a positive eﬀect on levels of observed trust in the JPE treatment. That
is, senders who had contributed relatively less to the dyad’s aggregate score
displayed less trust in their partner (see ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1 about here.
11The eﬀects of the RPE and JPE incentives appear to be very diﬀerent on
investment behaviors in the trust game. More precisely, if one interprets relative
performance on the exam as a proxy for one’s entitlement to the allocated
assets, the eﬀect of this proxy diﬀered across earning treatments. In some
sense, one can think of the incentive mechanisms as framing the context in
which score diﬀerences are perceived and thereby inﬂuence behavior.11 What
critically matters under each incentive mechanism is the relative performance
of the sender. Under tournament style incentives, the winner’s “property right”
exhibits a profound eﬀect such that losing senders cede assets and and thereby
trust the receiver. In team based incentives these property rights are less clear
and we therefore observe an asymmetric pattern of trust relative to the case of
tournaments. Indeed, team based incentives appear to only motivate a “team
identity” which is conducive to trust when the individual contributing relatively
more is in the role of the sender.
As in all other trust games, trust is reciprocally rewarded with trustwor-
thiness (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer, 2003; Fehr and G¨ achter, 2001). As such,
the greatest determinant of the amount returned y (both in terms of absolute
amount and proportion received) is investment x (p < 0.01 across all treat-
ments). In our experiments, the average amount returned was 36% of the
amount received and we ﬁnd no eﬀect from the earning mechanism on trustwor-
thiness. Thus, our results suggest that it is only in the motivation of trust that
we observe a treatment eﬀect. As a result, our treatment variable aﬀects only
the total surplus accruing to the pair.
11Similar results are obtained when examining senders’ score diﬀerentials as in the analysis
in Table 3 and Figure 1.
124 Discussion
Our results suggest that, while the presence of incentives aﬀects the formation
of trust, the manner in which these incentives are designed in the structure of
subsequent decision-making environments can exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
manifestation of trust. Thus, our analysis suggests that the eﬀect of contracts on
trust (e.g. Dirks and Ferrin, 2003) and the inconsistent evidence on the eﬀect
of trust on outcomes (e.g. Woodman and Sherwood, 1980) may be partially
explained by the manner in which antecedent incentives frame situations and
lead to diﬀerences in subsequent trusting behaviors.
There is a large literature exploring the eﬀects of earnings on behavior in
bargaining games. This literature ﬁnds that individuals recognize the entitle-
ments accruing to themselves and others through the exertion of eﬀort (Cherry
et al., 2002; Hoﬀman and Spitzer, 1985; Ruﬄe, 1998), suggesting that found
money eﬀects matter (Arkes et al., 1994; Thaler, 1999). Relatedly, Sonnegard
(1996) ﬁnds that behavior is inﬂuenced by framing eﬀects associated with the
description of property rights. In the experiments of Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000),
individuals exerted eﬀort to earn money to be used in a trust game and stronger
property rights on the part of the receiver (trustee) resulted in larger investments
by the sender (trustor).
Senders’ behavior in our RPE treatments is explained by this adherence to
perceived property rights. Losing senders could have chosen x = 0 but instead
opted to invest a signiﬁcant amount and trust the receiver. From the receiver’s
standpoint, this indicates not only a level of trust, but also a respect to the
implied property rights created by the RPE. Senders who lost the tournament
may have considered receivers as more entitled to the assets than themselves,
and hence invested more.
The asymmetry trusting behavior of winning and losing senders in our
13RPE treatment also suggests an interesting relationship between hierarchies
and weak/strong situations (in terms of incentives and contracting). From the
standpoint of a winning sender, the trust game can be considered a strong
situation in which property rights are well-established and deﬁned. As such,
following the ideas of Dirks and Ferrin (2001), trust is unlikely to have large
positive eﬀects (deﬁned as the amount which is sent to the receiver). On the
other hand, losing senders are in a weak situation in which there is conﬂict
between the previously established property rights and the actual possession of
resources. In such a situation, trust has large positive eﬀects.
This asymmetry is reversed in our JPE treatment. Here, it appears that
these incentives were only eﬀective in promoting a “team” environment con-
ducive to trust when the individual contributing relatively more was in the role
of the sender in the trust game. As opposed to the situation in the RPE treat-
ment, the ambiguous nature of property rights under the JPE treatment created
a situation in which losing senders did not trust the behavior of (winning) re-
ceivers: Given that the property rights (based on relative contributions) did not
favor their share of the resources, they potentially expected winnings receivers
to withhold the lion’s share of resources and thereby not display trustworthiness.
As such, losing senders were unwilling to expose themselves to the behavior of
these senders. Moreover, the weak property rights in the JPE treatment may
have opened the door for losing senders to construe property rights in a self-
serving manner. Previous research (Babcock et al., 1995, 1996; Konow, 2000)
has demonstrated that individuals may manipulate their perceptions of fairness
in ways which rationalize their actions or improve their self-image. In a simi-
lar spirit, senders who had contributed relatively less (i.e. scored lower on the
exam) than their partnered receivers may have interpreted their contribution to
the pairs target in such a way as to rationalize their property right and hence
14sent less.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present an experiment in which the structure of an incen-
tive mechanism inﬂuences the way in which individuals behave in a subsequent
trust game. Our results seem to indicate that property rights matter, but the
interpretation of property rights depends on the context created by the incen-
tives. Speciﬁcally, under relative performance evaluations, senders recognized
the property rights accruing to themselves or their bargaining partner. However,
under joint performance evaluations, where property rights are less well-deﬁned,
senders appear to have been less forthcoming in recognizing the property rights
of others. This ﬁnding suggests some implications in regards to the internal
organization of the ﬁrm: First, team based structures may not always be as
helpful as suggested in the managerial literature in generating and increasing
trust between team members. Second, since property rights are less well de-
ﬁned in team environments, such work structure could actually be detrimental
in situations where trust is needed (eg. R&D). Third, our ﬁndings also suggests
that managers have to be careful with their decisions to implement team based
compensation schemes vs. individual performance compensation schemes.
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Figure 1: Investments as a function of exam score diﬀerences (sender’s score
less receiver’s score).
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